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Summary  findings
Small states have attractecl a good deal of research.  Their annual growth rates are more volatile, partly
Easterly and Kraay test wlhether microstates are any  because of their greater volatility in responses to terms-
different from other states in income, growth, and  of-trade shocks - to which they are exposed because of
volatility.  their greater openness. But on balance their greater
They find that, controlling for location, smaller states  openness pays off positively in growth.
are actually richer than other states in per capita GDP.  Easterly and Kraay do recommend that srmall  states
This income advantage largely reflects a productivity  diversify their risk by opening up more to interniational
advantage - evidence against the idea that microstates  capital markets, although the benefits of doing so are still
are unable to exploit increasing returns to scale.  unresolved in the literature.
Small states do not have different per capita growth  In general, they conclude, small states are no different
rates, with or without controls.  from large states and should receive the same policy
advice large states do.
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Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact  Kari Labrie, room  MC3-456,  telephone  202-473-1001,  fax 202-522-1155,
Internet  address  klabrie@o!worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http:,'/
www.worldbank.org/htmi/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  weasterly
(aworldbank.org  or akraay@worldbank.org. June  1999. (36 pages)
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X  Views  expressed  here are not necessarily  those of the World  Bank  or its member  governments.2
"Smallness  is neither  a necessary  nor sufflcient  condition  for slow economic  development"
T.N.  Srinivasan  (1986)
"Economic  storm clouds  are gathering  over  paradise and the outlook  is undeniably  gloomy.  "
A.  Dolman  (1985)
Do small states  suffer  from  their smallness?  There  are good  theoretical  reasons  to believe
that they do. The provision  of public services  may  be subject  to indivisibilities  that lead  to
increasing  returns  to scale (Alesina  and Spolaore  1997),  especially  fiscal institutions  (Easterly
and Rebelo  (1993))  and defense  (Kuznets  (1960),  Harden  (1985)).  Many  theories  of economic
growth  suggest  increasing  returns  to scale in  the private  economy  as well (Romer  1986,  Barro and
Sala-I-Martin  1995,  Aghion  and Howitt 1998),  which  may be difficult  to realize  in small states.
Small  economies  may also be at a disadvantage  because  their size  prevents  them from
diversifying  into a wide  range  of activities,  making  them more  vulnerable  to terms  of trade shocks
than large states  (Commonwealth  Secretariat  (1998)). Many  small states  suffer  from poor
location  in that they  are remote  and/or  landlocked,  and many are located  in regions prone  to
hurricanes  and volcanic  activity  (Srinivasan  (1986)). Public  officials  in small  states  may  be much
more  likely  to be subjected  to conflicting  pressures  (Farrugia  (1993)),  and it may be difficult  to
recruit  a high-quality  civil service  given  the limited  pool of candidates  in small states  (Streeten
(1993)).
These  potential  difficulties  facing  small  states  have  not been lost on policymakers  or
academics.  Numerous  conferences  and seminars  on the special  difficulties  of small states  have
been  convened  over the past forty years (Robinson  (1960),  Benedict  (1967),  Dobozi  et. al. (1982),
Commonwealth  Consultative  Group  (1985, 1997),  Small States  Financial  Forum (1987,1988),
Kaminarides  et. al. (1989)). International  organizations  such as the United  Nations  have
commissioned  studies  on the problems  confronting  small  states  for many years (United  Nations
(1971),  Doumenge  (1983)),  and  the United  Nations  has formally  recognized  the special
difficulties  of small states  in a resolution  to that effect (Briguglio  (1995)). Titles of papers on
small  states  (see our bibliography)  frequently  feature  ominous  terms  and phrases  such  as
"Problems",  "Vulnerability",  "Small  is Dangerous",  and even (twice)  "Paradise  Lost".
In this paper,  we look  for empirical  evidence  of alleged  disadvantages  of size by
examining  microstates  with population  1 million  or less. (We  will use the terms "small  states"
and "microstates"  interchangeably).  If smallness  is a disadvantage,  then microstates  must suffer
with a vengeance.  In particular,  we would  expect  that microstates  must on average  be less3
developed and grow less rapidly than larger states. In this paper, we test this hypothesis using
cross-country data ia a large sample that includes many microstates.  In light of the grim
predictions of theory, the picture of microstates which emerges from this analysis is somewhat
surprising. After controlling for a range of factors, we find that microstates have on average
higher income and productivity levels than small states, and grow no more slowly than large
states. Per capita GDP growth rates are more volatile in microstates, due to their much greater
exposure to international trade and fluctuations in their terms of trade.  However, any growth
disadvantages of this greater volatility are more than outweighed by the growth benefits of trade
openness reaped by microstates by virtue of their necessarily large trade volumes.  Finally,
microstates are well-positioned to take advantage of opportunities international risk sharing, since
the correlation of economic fluctuations in microstates with the world business cycles is
surprisingly low.
These resulls contribute evidence in support of the growing view in the literature that
small size might not be a disadvantage after all.  Kuznets (1960) notes that small states also have
advantages: primarily that many are lucky to have good natural resources and have a small and
more cohesive populations which allows them to adapt better to change.  Srinivasan (1986) and
Streeten (1993) argue without systematic empirical evidence that small may also be beautiful.
Using a sample of 48 countries Millner and Westaway (1993) fail to find evidence that the effect
of a number of growth determinants varies with country size.  Armstrong et. al. (1998) uses cross-
sectional regressions covering a large number of small states and independent regions to argue
that population size.  does not significantly affect growth, controlling for initial income and
regional effects.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we document that
small states are richer and have higher productivity levels than small states.  In the following
section we observe that small states suffer no obvious growth rate disadvantage, and attribute this
to a number of offsetting advantages and disadvantages of small states.  In Section 3 we
document that although trade openness contributes significantly to the greater volatility of growth
in microstates, this is not the whole story.  In Section 4 we note that microstates are relatively
well-positioned to take advantage of opportunities to diversify away their special risks since they
currently are not particularly financially open and the shocks they receive are relatively
uncorrelated with those experienced by the rest of the world.  Section 5 offers concluding
remarks.I4
1.  Microstates  and per capita  income  levels
In this paper,  we consider  a large cross  section  of 157  countries  for which  at least 10
years of annual  data on per capita  GDP adjusted  for differences  in purchasing  power  parity is
available. Of these, 33 are microstates  defined  as having  an average  population  over  the period
1960-1995  of less than one million. These  countries  are listed  in Table 1, and range  in size from
tiny St. Kitts and Nevis with  population  of 42,000  to Mauritius  with 912,000. The income  range
is similarly  wide, from very poor African  countries  such  as Guineau-Bissau  and Comoros  with
real PPP-adjusted  per capita  GDPs  around  $600  to wealthy  oil-exporting  countries  such as Qatar
with per capita  GDP of over $18,000.
If microstates  suffer  from the disadvantages  of smallness,  they should  be poorer on
average  than larger  states. What  do we actually  find?  Not controlling  for any other  characteristic,
microstates  have  the same  range of per capita  incomes  as the rest of the samnple  (Figure 1).
However,  if we control  for the location  by continent  of all countries,  whether  they are oil
producers,  and whether  they belong  to the OECD,  then  microstates  are actually  significantly
richer  than other  states  (Regression  1). Microstates  are 50 percent  (=-exp(.4025)-1)  richer  than
other  states,  controlling  for location. We note  that this result  does  not reflect  the obvious  outliers
in the sample,  since  the oil exporting  countries  Qatar  and Bahrain  are picked  up by the OIL
dummy,  and Luxembourg  and Iceland  are picked  up by the OECD  member  dummy. Even  if we
exclude  two other particularly  wealthy  microstates  (Bermuda  and Bahamas),  we still  find that
microstates  are nearly  40 percent  richer  than other  states.  Figure  2 shows  the income  residual  by
quintile  of population,  and we see the very strong  income  effect  in the microstate  bottom  quintile
of population.  We also note  that the favourable  performance  of small  states carries  over to other
quality  of life indicators. For example,  if we in tum use under-five  infant  mortality  and life
expectancy  at birth as the dependent  variable  in the above  regression,  we find that infant  mortality
is significantly  lower in small states  by 22 per thousand,  while  life expectancy  is about  four years
higher.  We are not sure why  microstates  are so much  richer  than their regional  neighbours  and
have  so much  better human  development  indicators,  but we see this as a decisive  refutation  of the
macro  arguments  that microstates  suffer  from  a development  disadvantage.
Are microstates  richer  than others,  controlling  for location,  because  they save more  or
because  they have  a higher  productivity  level?  We use the Mankiw-Romer-Weil  (1992)5
regression  to answer  this question. In the steady-state  of  the Solow  model,  output  per person  is
given  by:
(1) Y/L = A (s/(x+&+n))x('-O')
where  Y/L is output  per person,  A is the level of labor-augmenting  productivity,  s is the
investment  to GDP ratio,  x is the rate of labor-augmenting  productivity  growth,  8 is depreciation,
n is population  growth,  and a is the share of capital  income  in GDP. We assume  productivity
growth of 2 percent and a depreciation rate of 7 percent. Following MRW, we take logs of both
sides and regress the log of output per person on the same dummies as above (capturing
continental and other productivity differences) and the log of the second multiplicative term in
(1):
(2) ln(Y/L)  = In A +  a/(1-a)  [In s - ln(x+5+n)]
We call this second term MRW, and the results of estimating this specification are in Regression
2. We find that small states' productivity advantage accounts for two-thirds of their income per
capita advantage.  Again this decisively refutes the notion that small states have a productivity
disadvantage due to increasing returns to scale. We also refute the original MRW idea that
productivity levels are the same across countries, as Asia and especially sub-Saharan Africa have
significantly lower productivity than other regions.  Once we allow the productivity level to vary,
the coefficient on MRW implies a capital share of  .28 - which is in line with most estimates
from national income accounting.
When  we decompose  MRW  into its numerator  and denominator  from equation  (1), we
find that small states have significantly higher (log) investment rates - see Regression 3 - but not
lower population growth rates (not shown). Hence, the one third of the small-state income effect
in Regression 1 that is not attributable to productivity differences is attributable to higher
investment in small states.
However, we should take with more than a grain of salt the result that investment
accounts for even as much as one-third of the income advantage of small states. The significance
of the MRW term in Regression 2 may reflect reverse causality - richer states can afford to invest
more and are usually thought to choose lower population growth than poor states.  Or it may6
reflect  an omitted  third factor,  like  incentive  policies  that affect both investment  and income.
One way of dealing  with omitted  third  factors  is to estimate  equation  2 in chages. The  results  are
not encouraging  to the MRW  explanation  of income  and growth.  In Regression  4 we estimate  the
change  in the MRW steady-state  level using  population  growth  and investment  rates for 1960-70
and  then 1985-95.  The change  in the MRW  steady  state levels  does not explain  the cross-country
differences  in growth  rates  over 1960-95.  Figure  3 shows  the variation  in growth  rates and in
MRW  steady  state changes  across  small  states.  A view that aU  countries  have  the same
productivity  growth  but have different  long-run  growth  rates  because  of changes  in steady  state
levels  doesn't work  in the data, either  for small  states  or aU  states.
Moreover,  the Solow/MRW  sources  of growth  accounting  implied  in (2) sometimes  gives
unreasonable  predictions.  For example,  figure  4 shows  actual  income  in Guyana  compared  to
Guyanese  income  assuming  a constant  productivity  growth  rate (x=.02)  and allowing  capital  per
person  growth  to evolve  using  actual  investment  rates and population  growth. 2 The  sources  of
growth  exercise  based on  the Solow/MRW  model cannot  account  for the boom  in the 70s  or for
the collapse  in the 80s.  Nor can  the sources  of growth exercise  based on the Solow/MRW  model
account  for the negative  growth  in Guyana  over  the 40 years 1950-90.  Capital  growth  per person
was so rapid  that Guyana  should  have  had six times  the income  in 1990  that it actually  had. Even
if we assumed  that productivity  growth  was  at a lower  bound  estimate  of 1 percent  over 40 years
(grey-shaded  area), we still arrive  at 4 times  the actual  income  in 1990.  Nor is there is a negative
level  shift of steady  state income  in Guyana,  because  the MRW change  is barely different  from
zero (see  the Guyana  -GUY-- point  in Figure  3). Clearly  the assumption  of a constant  (and
positive!)  productivity  growth  rate is untenable  for Guyana. But negative  productivity  growth
does  not make sense  in the Solow/MRW  framework  if x is interpreted  as technological  progress -
- it's hard to believe  that Guyana  had technological  regress. Nor does  the Solow/MRW
framework  give  us any explanation  as to why  productivity  growth  rates might  differ  across
countries.  We have  to move  outside  of the model  to recognize  that capital  growth  sometimes  does
not pass into  output  growth  as the SolowIMRW  predicts. This only strengthens  the presumption
that income  differences  like the small  state  positive  income  differential  have  primarily  to do with
differing levels of A - however that is interpreted - and little  to do with capital growth per
person.7
2.  Microstates  and Macro  Growth
Even if the microstates do not have a disadvantage in levels, they may nevertheless grow
more slowly over time.  Several endogenous growth theories have a scale effect on per capita
growth. Moreover, rmicrostates  exhibit greater output volatility which has negative effects on
growth (Ramey and Ramey (1996)).  Small states have the same range of growth experiences as
other states (Figure 5), suggesting that there is no obvious scale effect for growth rates. There is
also no growth difference for small states after controlling for continental location, oil, and
OECD dummies, as shown in Regression 5.
As in other work, sub-Saharan Africa has lower growth than the rest of the world
(Easterly and Levine 1997), and Asia has higher growth.  However, there is no evidence that
microstates either grow faster or slower than non-microstates
Why do small states not suffer any apparent growth disadvantages due to their small size?
To answer this question, we consider a parsimonious cross-country growth regression which
captures two of the factors prominent in the small states debate: openness to international trade
measured as the shaLre  of imports and exports in GDP, and volatility measured as the annual
standard deviation of growth rates within each country (Regression 6).  We also include initial
income to capture convergence effects, and secondary school enrollment rates as a measure of
human capital. All of the non-dummy variables are significant of the expected sign: there is
conditional converg,ence (negative coefficient on initial income), a positive effect of secondary
enrollment and trade openness, and a negative effect of the standard deviation of annual growth.
This regression framework provides some useful clues as to why the microstate dummy
is not significant in the basic regression 5.  In particular, we can see from this regression that
small states will have several offsetting advantages and disadvantages. They are richer than other
countries controlling for continent dummies (see previous section) and hence will have slower
growth than average by the conditional convergence effect. They have slightly higher secondary
enrollment, which would give therm  higher growth, but the difference is not statistically
significant (results not  shown). Most important, microstates tend to have much higher trade
shares (which is good for growth), offset by much higher volatility of growth rates (which is bad
2 We follow  the usuaL  conventions,  using  the perpetual  inventory  method  to calculate  the capital  stock and
calculating  the initial  y/k as (x+5+nr/s  where  n and  s are average  population  growth  and investment  rates,8
for growth). 3 The insignificance of the microstate dummy therefore suggests that the negative
effects of high initial income and high volatility are roughly offset by the positive effects of trade
openness and better educational attainment.
In order to document the magnitude of these offsetting effects, we first need to know how
different microstates are from non-microstates in terms of their trade volumes and volatility.  We
first document the well-known fact that microstates typically have much higher trade ratios than
larger states, as illustrated by Regression 7.  The consequences for openness of being a small state
are truly remarkable.  Small states have a ratio of trade to GDP that is 54 percentage points (1.2
standard deviations) higher than the average economy controlling for continent dummies!
Second, real per capita GDP growth rates tend to be much more volatile in small states, as
illustrated by Regression 8.4 In particular, the standard deviation of annual real per capita GDP
growth is 1.4 percentage points higher in microstates than in non-microstates.
We have already shown that small states have higher income, which is a growth
disadvantage because of the convergence effect.  They also have higher secondary enrollment
controlling for the usual dummies, which is a growth advantage, although the effect is not
statistically significant.  If the small state dummy is not significant in the overall growth
regression (Regression 5 earlier), then the advantages and disadvantages of smallness must be
roughly offsetting. Interestingly, the positive growth effect of openness (0.012x0.54=0.65
percent) is 2.5 times larger than the negative growth effect (-1.79x0.014-0.25  percent) of small
states' greater output volatility. If output volatility is one of the consequences of openness (on
which more below), this suggests that small states' greater openness is still on balance a positive
factor for small states' growth.  This finding is of particular interest, given the widely held view
that small states suffer from their openness. 5 Any source of growth volatility that is not related to
openness, on the other hand, is detrimental to small states' growth.
In summary, there is no evidence that small states suffer any growth disadvantage from
their small size.  This finding can be explained by several offsetting advantages and
respectively,  over  the entire 40 year  period.
3 The model  of the aforementioned  Alesi;,m  and Spolaore  1997  has  the prediction  that openness  will  make
small states  more  viable.
4In  interesting  historical  footnote  is that  the greater  volatility  of small  states has not always  been  accepted.
Tarshis  (1960)  finds little evidence  of a relationship  between  the coefficient  of variation  of per capita
income  and size  across  US states,  and  poses this as a puzzle.9
disadvantages of small states.  Although they are richer and experience more volatile shocks tha
non-microstates, they reap substantial growth advantages from their exposure to international
trade.
Finally, it is interesting to note that one often-heard benefit of microstates does not
appear to be empirically very important. It is often argued that one of the advantages of
microstates is that they tend to be ethnically very homogeneous, which may make it easier for
such states to forge the political consensus required to adjust to a changing environment (for
example, Kuznets (1]960)). Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999)
find that measures of ethnic fractionalization are associated with a lower level of public goods
provision and lower growth. However, the mean value of the ethnolinguistic indicator of ethnic
diversity among those microstates for which data is available is insignificantly different from that
among non-microstates, suggesting that the benefits of homogeneity may not be especially
pronounced for microstates.
3.  Openness and V'olatility
In the previous Section we saw that microstates reap growth benefits from their openness
to international trade, but suffer growth costs due to their greater volatility of growth rates.  In
this section we consider in more detail the relationship between trade openness and volatility in
microstates.  A significant portion of the growth rate volatility experienced by small states can be
attributed to volatility in their terms of trade, but this is not the entire story.  Even after
controlling for terms of trade volatility, growth rates in microstates are significantly more volatile
than in non-microstates.
We note first that the volatility of terms of trade shocks experienced by microstates is
much greater than for larger states. We define terms of trade shocks as the growth in the local
currency price of exports times the share of exports in GDP less the growth in the local currency
price of imports less;  the share of iimports  in GDP, which captures both the magnitude of price
fluctuations (changes in export and import prices) and their importance for the domestic economy
(weighted by the shares of exports and imports in GDP).  We then regress the standard deviation
of this measure of terms of trade shocks on the same set of regional dummies as before, dunmny
5 This  view of small  states  dates  back  at least to Scitovsky  (1960). Dolman  (1985)  goes  so far as to suggest
that  many small  island states  would  be better off reverting  to auaic  subsistence  economies.10
variables to capture oil exporters and commodity exporters who are more likely to suffer extreme
fluctuations in their terms of trade, and the microstate dummy (Regression 9). We find that there
is a highly significant microstate effect, with the standard deviation of terms of trade shocks
larger by 0.0 13 (or about one-third of one standard deviation of the dependent variable) in
microstates.
This terms of trade volatility might be due to two factors.  First, we have already seen
that the share of trade in GDP is especially large in microstates, and this may contribute to the
magnitude of our measure of terms of trade shocks (since it weights changes in import and export
prices by the shares of imports and exports in GDP).  Second, microstates' exports are likely to be
more specialized than those of large states, both in terms of products exported and in terms of
export markets (Kuznets (1960), Knox (1967), Annstrong and Read (1998)).  The distinction
between these factors is important because there is little that microstates can do about their
overall trade volumes - autarky is simply not an option for small states that produce a much
narrower range of goods and services than they consume, and moreover we have already
documented the substantial growth benefits accruing to small states due to their openness. If in
contrast the greater volatility of growth is due to excessive reliance on a few export products and
a few export markets, then policies designed to help diversify exports may help to dampen
economic fluctuations.
We can get a rough idea of the relative importance of these two factors by redefining the
terms of trade shock as the unweighted difference between the growth in export prices and the
growth in import prices.  When we use this alternative measure of terms of trade shocks as the
dependent variable in  Regression 9, we find that the microstates dummy is negative and
insignificant (Regression 10). That is, the volatility of changes in the price of exports relative to
imports are if anything lower in microstates relative to larger states.  Although this is not
conclusive evidence, it does cast doubt on the notion that microstates are especially vulnerable to
external shocks simply because their international trade is more specialized.  Rather, the greater
volatility of terms of trade shocks in microstates is primarily due to their unavoidably large trade
shares.
Finally, it is worth noting that greater volatility of growth in microstates is not solely due
to their greater susceptibility to terms of trade shocks.  To illustrate this point, we re-estimate
Regression 8, but include the volatility of the terms of trade as an explanatory variable11
(Regression 11). We find that the microstate dummy remains significant even after controlling
for the effect of greater terms of trade volatility on the volatility of overall growth.  This
additional volatility may be due tb several factors.  Many of the microstates in our sample are
located in areas prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes, and the higher growth volatility in
small states may simply reflect the devastating effect of these natural forces.  However, it is also
possible that some of this observed volatility reflects difficulties in measuring per capita incomes,
which may be particularly acute in small states where statistical institutions may be weaker than
average.
4.  Opportunities  fDr  Diversification
In the previous section we have seen that microstates experience much more volatile
growth rates than non-microstates.  This in part reflects their greater vulnerability to terms of
trade shocks, and also the tendency of many microstates to suffer heavily from natural disasters.
In this section we briefly consider the potential of small states to mitigate the adverse effects of
this largely-unavoidable volatility by sharing risks with the rest of the world.
One of the potential benefits of financial openness is that it allows countries to share risks
with the rest of the world, by holding claims on assets located outside their borders whose returns
are not perfectly cor.related  with returns to domestic assets.  The magnitude of these benefits
depends on how volatile are shocks to the domestic economy, and the extent to which they are
uncorrelated with shocks abroad.  Small states are particularly well-situated to benefit from such
risk sharing arrangements, for two reasons. First, small states suffer large shocks, as documented
in Section 3.  Second, in contrast to the often-heard view that small states are particularly
susceptible to cyclical fluctuations in large states, we find that the shocks experienced by small
states are not unusually correlated with the world business cycle.  We illustrate this point with
Regression 12, which regresses the correlation of per capita GDP growth in a country with OECD
average real per capita GDP growth on the same set of dummies as before, as well as the
logarithm of average per capita CiDP  (to capture the stylized fact document by Kraay and Ventura
(1998) that business cycles in poorer countries tend to be less correlated with the world average
cycle), and a microstate dummy.  The microstate dummy is insignificant, suggesting that
microstates are not unusually correlated with the OECD cycle.  However, it is important to note
that growth rates in neighbouring microstates may be highly correlated, especially to the extent
that growth rate volatility reflects natural disasters such as hurricanes.  This suggests that regional12
arrangements  to share risk among  microstates  will  be much  less valuable  than pooling  risks with
a wider  range  of countries.
Despite  the potential  benefits  of risk sharing  through  participation  in intemational
financial  markets,  microstates  do not appear  to be especially  open  financially. We illustrate  this
with  Regressions  13-14,  which  regress  two alternative  measures  of financial  openess  on a set of
regional  dummies  as well  as the logarithm  of average  per capita  income. In Regression  13  the
dependent  variable  is the fraction  of years for which  data is available  in which  the  IMfF  reports
restrictions  on capital  account  transactions  in that country. 6 The coefficient  on the microstate
dummy  is positive,  although  insignificantly  so. This suggests  that microstates  are not particularly
open  to financial  flows, as measured  by legal impediments  to such  flows. Combining  this
observation  with the empirical  results of Lewis (1995),  who  finds  that consumption  risks are less
diversified  in countries  with  this measure  of capital  controls,  this suggests  that microstates  are not
taking  full advantage  of the opporunities  for risk diversification  afforded  by international  capital
markets. The  outcome  measure  of financial  openness  paints  a somewhat  more  favourable  picture,
as the microstate  dummy  is positive  and statistically  significant  at conventional  levels. This
suggests  that the volume  of capital  flows  is slightly  larger  for microstates  than  for non-
microstates,  although  the magnitude  of this effect  is small  - only  about 2 percentage  points  of
GDP. Overall,  this evidence  suggests  that microstates  are not as financially  open as they  might
be given  the high volatility  they face, and hence  are not fully exploiting  opportmities  for
international  risk diversification.
We conclude  this section  with the observation  that although  greater financial  openness
may help microstates  insure  against  the large  shocks  they receive,  financial  openness  is itself  no
panacea. Grilli  and Milesi-Ferretti  (1995)  and Rodrik  (1998)  both note that there is no evidence
that financially-open  economies  grow  faster  or enjoy  higher  investment  rates. On the other  hand,
there is also no systematic  evidence  in favor of the popular  view  that by opening  up financially,
countries  expose  themselves  to greater  volatility  due  to the vagaries  of international  financial
markets  (Kraay  (1998)). In summary,  although  financial  openness  may  provide  a valuable  means
for small  states  to diversify  some of the large risks  they  face, existing  evidence  does not support
the view  that there  will be a large  growth  payoff  from  such policies.
6 As  reported  in the  Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions.  The
disadvantages  of  this measure  are  well-known.  First,  it captures  only  the  presence,  and  not  the  intensity  of
controls.  Second,  it captures  only  controls  on  residents,  and  not  on  non-residents,  although  there  is some
presumption  that  these  two  types  of controls  are  correlated  across  countries.13
5.  Conclusions
Our analysis  suggests  that small  states  have  perhaps  received  excessive  attention  from  the
literature  - notwithstanding  our own  addition  to the literature!  -as special  cases calling  for special
policy  measures.  We  find that microstates  have,  if anything,  significantly  higher  per capita
income  than others  in their region.  There  is no significant  difference  in growth  performance
between  large  and small  states. It is true that growth  volatility  and volatility  of terms  of trade
shocks  as percent  of GDP  is higher  in small states,  but this is due entirely  to their greater  trade
openness  - and the net  benefits  of openness  on growth  are positive. The  one missing  piece in the
current  situation  of rnicrostates  is that they are  not fully exploiting  the potential  to diversify  their
risks  by opening  up to international  capital  movements.  But even  the payoff  to filling in this last
missing  piece is unclear  from evidence  in the literature.
This is not to say  that microstates  are free  of economic  problems! Many microstates  are
still  poor, and promoting  growth  out of that poverty  is as important  as it is in other  poor countries.
The  good news  is that the lessons  of experience  from all countries  are applicable  to small states,
so they can benefit  from  the large amount  of cross-country  evidence  on the determinants  of long-
run growth.14
Tables  and  Figures
Table  1 - Small  States
Population  Average Per Capita
(Thousands)  GDP, 1985 PPP-Adjusted Dollars
ATG  Antigua and Barbuda  63  5329
BHR  Bahrain  419  10342
BHS  Bahamas, The  237  11136
BLZ  Belize  178  3548
BMU  Bermuda  58  15356
BRB  Barbados  247  5341
BWA  Botswana  880  1516
COM  Comoros  340  632
CPV  Cape Verde  295  746
CYP  Cyprus  638  5084
DJI  Djibouti  344  1479
FJI  Fiji  602  3149
GAB  Gabon  777  3853
GMB  Gambia, The  628  803
GNB  Guinea-Bissau  739  644
GRD  Grenada  92  2632
GUY  Guyana  719  1630
ISL  Iceland  223  9689
KNA  St. Kitts and Nevis  42  4399
LCA  St. Lucia  148  3264
LUX  Luxembourg  358  11934
MDV  Maldives  201  1908
MLT  Malta  341  4049
MUS  Maurtius  916  4092
QAT  Qatar  384  18278
REU  Reunion  496  2253
SLB  Solomon Islands  299  1845
SUR  Suriname  378  2877
SWZ  Swaziland  556  2358
SYC  Seychelles  59  2214
VCT  St. Vincent and the Grenad  107  3312
VUT  Vanuatu  145  1633
WSM  Samoa  160  184415
Regression 1
Dependent Variable: log of average income 1960-95
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 157
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard Errors & Covanance
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
SMALLSTATE  0.402504  0.108228  3.588670  0.0005
ASIA  7.517973  0.111549  52.12283  0.0000
AFRICA  6.691796  0.085404  81.37846  0.0000
WESTERN  7.932229  0.098881  85.54604  0.0000
HEMISPHERE
MIDDLE EAST & N.  7.863013  0.169759  45.58837  0.0000
AFRICA
EUROPE &  8.100983  0.116053  76.49556  0.0000
CENTRAL ASIA
OIL  0.814728  0.178268  4.900633  0.0000
OECD  1.168653  0.148174  9.309253  0.0000
R-squared  0.708909  Mean dependent var  7.855922
Adjusted R-squared  0.695233  S.D. dependent var  0.98294616
Regression 2
Dependent Variable: log of average income 1960-95
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 139
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
ASIA  7.438718  0.142546  52.18481  0.0000
EUROPE &  7.714671  0.133412  57.82584  0.0000
CENTRAL ASIA
WESTERN  7.800517  0.094056  82.93488  0.0000
HEMISPHERE
MIDDLE EAST & N.  7.763342  0.143795  53.98906  0.0000
AFRICA
OECD  1.122059  0.113640  9.873815  0.0000
OIL  0.691713  0.150642  4.591781  0.0000
AFRICA  6.865222  0.093269  73.60652  0.0000
SMALLSTATE  0.267340  0.132294  2.020799  0.0454
MRW  0.389346  0.101618  3.831453  0.0002
R-squared  0.761487  Mean dependent var  7.795722
Adjusted R-squared  0.746809  S.D. dependent var  0.99444917
Regression  3
Dependent Variable: Log of average investment rate/GDP (PPP) 60-95
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 139
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covanance
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
ASIA  -1.867634  0.117983  -15.82967  0.0000
AFRICA  -2.581324  0.117818  -21.90938  0.0000
WESTERN  -1.968057  0.072648  -27.09038  0.0000
HEMISPHERE
MIDDLE EAST & N.  -2.064563  0.158454  -13.02945  0.0000
AFRICA
EUROPE &  -1.493982  0.084612  -17.65692  0.0000
CENTRAL ASIA
OIL  0.137961  0.160770  0.858126  0.3924
OECD  0.198926  0.098043  2.028980  0.0445
SMALLSTATE  0.381396  0.107068  3.562201  0.0005
R-squared  0.440238  Mean dependent var  -1.956707
Adjusted R-squared  0.410327  S.D. dependent var  0.68018118
Regression 4
Dependent  Variable:  Average  per capita  growth  1960-95
Method:  Least  Squares
Included  observations:  133
Variable  Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
C  0.018962  0.001613  11.75912  0.0000
DMRW6095  0.003758  0.002847  1.319799  0.1892
R-squared  0.013122  Mean  dependent  var  0.019050
Adjusted  R-squared  0.005589  S.D.  dependent  var  0.01863319
Regression  5
Dependent Variaible:  Average per capita growth 1960-95
Method: Least Siquares
Included observations: 154
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
ASIA  0.026679  0.004888  5.457927  0.0000
AFRICA  0.006639  0.002874  2.310184  0.0223
WESTERN  0.016090  0.002569  6.263201  0.0000
HEMISPHERE
MIDDLE EAST & N.  0.018039  0.006376  2.829106  0.0053
AFRICA
EUROPE &  0.020941  0.004848  4.319413  0.0000
CENTRAL ASIA
OIL  -0.014381  0.007439  -1.933011  0.0552
OECD  0.006522  0.004430  1.472347  0.1431
SMALLSTATE  0.002222  0.004983  0.445971  0.6563
R-squared  0.195323  Mean dependent var  0.016336
Adjusted R-squared  0.156743  S.D. dependent var  0.02132320
Regression 6
Dependent  Variable:  Average  per capita  growth  1960-95
Method:  Least  Squares
Included  observations:  130
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard  Errors  & Covarance
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
ASIA  0.137565  0.024502  5.614343  0.0000
AFRICA  0.117585  0.023412  5.022435  0.0000
WESTERN  0.134214  0.026701  5.026535  0.0000
HEMISPHERE
MIDDLE  EAST  & N.  0.137746  0.024181  5.696354  0.0000
AFRICA
EUROPE  &  0.136707  0.025164  5.432535  0.0000
CENTRAL  ASIA
OIL  -0.000407  0.004736  -0.085912  0.9317
OECD  0.009192  0.005901  1.557607  0.1220
LQIN60  -0.017360  0.003702  -4.689944  0.0000
SECONDARY  0.000342  0.000111  3.069972  0.0027
ENROLLMENT  60-95
Share  of Trade  in  0.012076  0.002746  4.397740  0.0000
GDP  60-95
Standard  Deviation  of  -0.179370  0.082047  -2.186187  0.0308
Growth  60-95
R-squared  0.535076  Mean  dependent  var  0.016972
Adjusted  R-squared  0.496006  S.D.  dependent  var  0.01961221
Regression 7
Dependent  Variable:  Share  of  Trade  in GDP  60-95
Method:  Least  Squares
Included  observations:  158
White  Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard  Errors  & Covanance
Variable  Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
ASIA  0.657933  0.128117  5.135396  0.0000
AFRICA  0.522459  0.042598  12.26481  0.0000
WESTERN  0.613623  0.063168  9.714153  0.0000
HEMISPHERE
MIDDLE  EAST  & N.  0.698416  0.081605  8.558546  0.0000
AFRICA
EUROPE  &  0.788507  0.059614  13.22688  0.0000
CENTRAL  ASIA
OIL  0.145042  0.094684  1.531846  0.1277
OECD  -0.178562  0.077809  -2.294883  0.0231
SMALLSTATE  0.538525  0.070860  7.599897  0.0000
R-squared  0.285557  Mean  dependent  var  0.739223
Adjusted  R-squared  0.252217  S.D.  dependent  var  0.43678422
Regression 8
Dependent  Variable:  Standard  Deviation  of Growth  60-95
Method:  Least  Squares
Included  observations:  154
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard  Errors  & Covarance
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
ASIA  0.047770  0.002558  18.67561  0.0000
AFRICA  0.061945  0.002457  25.21095  0.0000
WESTERN  0.049090  0.002689  18.25762  0.0000
HEMISPHERE
MIDDLE  EAST  & N.  0.060996  0.006357  9.595790  0.0000
AFRICA
EUROPE  &  0.055067  0.004943  11.14022  0.0000
CENTRAL  ASIA
OIL  0.015740  0.004851  3.244719  0.0015
OECD  -0.025540  0.004311  -5.924337  0.0000
SMALLSTATE  0.014339  0.003346  4.285854  0.0000
R-squared  0.467655  Mean  dependent  var  0.055809
Adjusted  R-squared  0.442131  S.D.  dependent  var  0.02142623
Regression 9
Dependent  variable:  Standard  Deviation  of  Terms  of  Trade  Shocks  1960-95
Number  of  observations:  114
Mean  of dep.  var.  .038019  LM het.  test  =  1.87192  [.171]
Std.  dev.  of dep.  var.  .021479  Durbin-Watson  =  2.07124
[<.8691
Sum of  squared  residuals  =  .026595  Jarque-Bera  test  =  2.17388  (.337]
Variance  of residuals  =  .250897E-03  Ramsey's  RESET2  =  .137189  (.712]
Std.  error  of  regression  .015840  F  (zero  slopes)  =  14.5415  [.000]
1R-squared =  .489871  Schwarz  B.I.C.  = -8.03086
Adjusted  R-squared  =  .456183  Log  likelihood  =  314.945
Estimated  Standard
Variable  Coefficient  Error  t-statistic  P-value
SSA  .04:2971  .419929E-02  10.2330  [.000]
ASIA  .022997  .323085E-02  7.11797  [.000]
ECA  .016725  .219593E-02  7.61616  (.000]
MENA  .039738  .690534E-02  5.75471  [.000)
LAC  .037033  .317373E-02  11.6685  [.000]
OIL  .02:3363  .503847E-02  4.63685  [.000]
COMMOD  .740058E-02  .452971E-02  1.63379  [.105]
MICROSTATE  .01:3328  .473321E-02  2.81585  [.006]
Standard  Errors  are heteroskedastic-consistent  (HCTYPE=2).24
Regression 10
Dependent  variable:  Standard  Deviation  of  Unweighted  Terms  of  Trade  Shocks
1960-95
Number of observations:  114
Mean of dep. var. =  .126255  LM het. test =  3.77342 [.052]
Std. dev. of dep. var.  =  .072712  Durbin-Watson =  2.36931 [<.9971
Sum of squared residuals =  .314207  Jarque-Bera  test =  3.85662 (.145]
Variance of residuals =  .296422E-02  Ramsey's RESET2 =  .084551 [.772]
Std. error of regression =  .054445  F (zero  slopes) =  13.6498  (.000]
R-squared =  .474073  Schwarz B.I.C. =  -5.56154
Adjusted R-squared =  .439342  Log likelihood =  174.193
Estimated  Standard
Variable  Coefficient  Error  t-statistic  P-value
SSA  .146951  .011390  12.9012  t.0003
ASIA  .094062  .011595  8.11254  [.000]
ECA  .046957  .553333E-02  8.48622  [.000)
MENA  .138424  .029647  4.66910  (.000]
LAC  .140449  .014181  9.90428  [.000]
OIL  .074365  .023821  3.12183  [.002]
COMMOD  .023068  .012845  1.79589  [.075]
MICROSTATE  -.011439  .011375  -1.00558  [.317]
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent  (HCTYPE=2).25
Regression  11
Dependent variable: Standard Deviation  of Real Per Capita GDP Growth 1960-1995
Number of observations:  114
Mean of dep. var. =  .052993  LM het. test =  .058422 [.809]
Std. dev. of dep. var. =  .021039  Durbin-Watson =  1.82486 [<.466]
Sum of squared residuals =  .023269  Jarque-Bera test =  7.39687 (.025]
Variance of residuals =  .221607E-03  Ramsey's RESET2 = .32S584E-02 (.955]
Std. error of regression =  .014886  F (zero  slopes) =  15.0879 [.000]
R-squared =  .534787  Schwarz B.I.C. =  -8.12293
Adjusted R-squared =  .499342  Log likelihood =  322.561
Estimated  Standard
Variable  Coefficient  Error  t-statistic  P-value
SSA  .045460  .524191E-02  8.67245  [.000]
ASIA  .0376574  .424625E-02  8.87235  [.000]
ECA  .028!505  .330153E-02  8.63375  [.000]
MENA  .046493  .842420E-02  5.51904  [.000]
LAC  .034650  .462190E-02  7.49686  (.000]
OIL  .012151  .580664E-02  2.09255  [.039]
COMMOD  .709771E-02  .396159E-02  1.79163  [.076]
MICROSTATE  .020540  .518460E-02  3.96181  (.000]
Standard  .249983  .105027  2.38017  (.019]
Deviation Of
Terms of Trade
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent  (HCTYPE=2).26
Regrssion  12
Dependent variable: Correlation  of Real Per Capita GDP Growth with OECD
Average Real Per Capita GDP Growth, 1960-95
Number of observations:  155
Mean of dep. var. =  .246648  LM het. test =  .866619 [.352]
Std. dev. of dep. var. =  .267756  Durbin-Watson =  1.95295 (<.711]
Sum of squared residuals  =  7.23486  Jarque-Bera test =  .769712 (.681]
Variance of residuals  =  .049896  Ramsey's RESET2 =  .034630 [.853]
Std. error of regression =  .223373  F (zero  slopes) =  8.47520 (.000]
R-squared =  .344712  Schwarz B.I.C. =  -2.73913
Adjusted R-squared =  .304039  Log likelihood =  17.5644
Estimated  Standard
Variable  Coefficient  Error  t-statistic  P-value
SSA  -.717189  .199481  -3.59529  [.000]
ASIA  -.712958  .231572  -3.07877  (.002]
ECA  -.638812  .239380  -2.66861  (.0081
MENA  -.822765  .233648  -3.52138  (.001]
LAC  -.692913  .232984  -2.97408  [.003]
OECD  .082437  .068673  1.20043  [.232]
LOGQAV6095  .119230  .029067  4.10185  (.000]
OIL  -.077165  .065326  -1.18123  (.239]
COMMOD  .026310  .057571  .456996  [.648]
MICROSTATE  .013354  .053808  .248181  (.804]
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent  (HCTYPE=2).27
Regrssion  13
Dependent variable: Fraction of Years in Which Capital Controls in Place,
1960-1995
Number of obse:rvations: 139
Mean of dep. var. = .787387  LK het. test =  12.2811 J.0001
Std. dev. of  dep. var. =  .342953  Durbin-Watson =  2.03770 [<.867]
Sum of squared residuals = 11.7237  Jarque-Bera  test =  35.1819 [.000]
Variance of residuals =  .090881  Ramsey's RESET2 =  2.65476 (.106]
std. error  of regression  =  .301465  F (zero  slopes) =  5.51078 (.000)
R-squared =  .277703  Schwarz B.I.C. =  -2.11787
Adjusted R-squared =  .227311  Log likelihood =  -25.3683
Estimated  Standard
Variable  Coefficient  Error  t-statistic  P-value
SSA  2.09580  .328127  6.38717  [.000]
ASIA  2.0)6680  .375284  5.50729  (.000]
ECA  2.39422  .403090  5.93967  [.000]
MENA  2.13384  .384726  5.54640  (.000]
LAC  2.0)8108  .393251  5.29200  (.000]
OECD  -.149049  .100129  -1.48857  (.139]
COMMOD  .541426E-02  .062675  .086386  [.931]
OIL  -.097368  .115647  -.841936  [.401]
LOGQAV6095  -.170939  .049805  -3.43213  t.001]
MICROSTATE  .025574  .080311  .318431  (.751]
Standard Errors are heteroskedastic-consistent  (HCTYPE=2).28
Regression  14
Dependent  variable:  Average  Capital  Inflows  Plus  Capital  Outflows  as  a  Fraction  of  GDP,
1960-95
Number  of  observations:  132
Mean of dep. var. =  .062080  LM het. test =  12.0349 [.001]
Std. dev. of dep. var. =  .058247  Durbin-Watson =  2.03507 [<.866]
Sum of squared residuals =  .329045  Jarque-Bera test =  111.565  [.000]
Variance of residuals =  .269709E-02  Ramsey's RESET2 =  .463370 (.497]
Std. error of regression =  .051933  F  (zero slopes) =  4.75418 [.000]
R-squared =  .259653  Schwarz B.I.C. =  -5.62445
Adjusted R-squared =  .205037  Log likelihood =  208.328
Estimated  Standard
Variable  Coefficient  Error  t-statiozic  P-value
SSA  -. 109303  .089036  -1.22763  [.222]
ASIA  -. 123786  .091137  -1.35824  [.177]
ECA  -. 126912  .102485  -1.23834  [.218]
MENA  -. 116162  .103124  -1.12643  (.262]
LAC  -.153697  .104193  -1.47512  [.143]
OECD  .016410  .028921  .567432  [.571]
COMMOD  -.013906  .011405  -1.21930  [.225]
OIL  -.027007  .015827  -1.70637  [.090]
LOGQAV6095  .023934  .013285  1.80152  (.074]
MICROSTATE  .027312  .013028  2.09646  [.038]
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Figure 2: Unexplained income level and population size
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